The dangerous illusion is that an ideology dies when it loses the territory it once controlled. Islamist extremism demonstrates why that reading fails. It can be deprived of camps, headquarters and public parades of armed fighters while retaining people, networks and narratives. The real confrontation begins where military success is treated as a sufficient political response. When the state stops monitoring recruitment because it has destroyed a base, it leaves room for the next generation to organise differently.
We do not need to label every Muslim a suspect to recognise the danger. We need to identify precisely the ideology that justifies murdering civilians by invoking a religious command. The term Islamist extremism describes this political and ideological exploitation of faith. It does not describe an entire religion or the everyday lives of millions of people. Precision here is an operational necessity: anyone looking for an undefined religious enemy will struggle to identify the actual recruiter.
The threat extends beyond the map
The Security Council briefing in August 2026 records that Islamic State continues to exploit conflict and instability alongside digital platforms, artificial intelligence and unmanned systems. The conclusion is strategic: the organisation treats technology as a means of adaptation. Counterterrorism policy must therefore monitor the physical environment, financing and communications simultaneously. Success in one area does not automatically eliminate the threat in the others.
In Europe, Europol’s historical figures for 2024 provide a concrete measure of the problem. Of 58 recorded attacks, including failed and foiled attempts, 24 were attributed to jihadist terrorism. The same category caused five deaths and eighteen injuries. This is a snapshot of a particular year, rather than a current tally. It nevertheless shows that the threat already had continuity and an operational presence within the Union.
More troubling is the same report’s observation that minors network online, become radicalised together and plan attacks. This picture forces the authorities to shift their attention. A potential recruit does not have to travel to a country at war to enter an extremist environment. Ideological involvement can precede any physical contact. A child can be inside the family home and simultaneously inside a circle that turns isolation into hatred.
Who constructs the enemy?
Indoctrination works when it offers a simplified explanation for every personal and collective trauma. It promises identity, purpose and recognition. It then demands obedience and constructs categories of people who supposedly deserve no protection. This is the crucial transition: from indignation to the moral authorisation of violence. Anger over a war, an injustice or a humiliation does not inevitably produce terrorism. A mechanism is needed to present murder as an answer and the civilian as a permissible target.
My assessment is that democracies waste valuable time when they discuss only the weapon used at the end. A knife, a vehicle or access to a critical facility comes at the end of the journey. Before that lie contact, validation, isolation and acceptance of a murderous obligation. Prevention must investigate that journey through evidence and scrutiny, instead of waiting until the last moment to demonstrate resolve.
The discussion must also include Africa. The UNDP study published in 2023, based on almost 2,200 interviews across eight countries, identified the search for employment as an important recruitment incentive. Religion did not emerge as the sole or dominant factor. This does not absolve extremist ideology. It explains that an armed organisation can recruit by exploiting the need to survive and subsequently impose its own ideological framework.
The same material shows why arbitrary state conduct can fuel recruitment. Protecting the population, providing justice and delivering basic services are part of security. A state that appears only as a punitive force allows the extremist to pose as a protector. Counterterrorism requires strength, but it also requires an effective political presence. When the latter is absent, the former ends up continually pursuing people who are replaced by new recruits.
Greece’s responsibility
For Greece, the response must be concrete: systematic intelligence cooperation, protection of critical infrastructure, scrutiny of financing channels and adequate knowledge of the digital environment. These priorities require personnel, continuity and evaluation of results. An announcement after an international attack is insufficient. Nor is treating religious practice as evidence of criminal intent justified. An agency that relies on sweeping generalisations wastes resources and undermines the relationships it needs to obtain timely information.
At the political level, the habit of selective concern must be abandoned. The murder of civilians must be condemned by the same standard, regardless of nationality or religion. Criticism of a government’s policies remains legitimate and necessary. Turning a population into a collective target is a different act and must be identified in time. When public debate allows the two to become confused, the propagandist gains room to portray an attack on human beings as a supposed act of resistance.
What is needed is a sustained policy that measures success before disaster strikes. How many dangerous pathways were identified? How many young people were diverted from recruitment? How much intelligence was acted upon in time? These questions require accountability without disclosure of operational secrets. They also require institutional memory. Every change of government or leadership cannot erase the experience of the services. Security is built through continuity, rather than periodic outbreaks of panic and announcements forgotten as soon as publicity fades.
Society must also protect public debate. Neither avoiding discussion of Islamist ideology nor treating every Muslim family with suspicion helps. The former leaves the recruiter beyond scrutiny. The latter alienates potential allies and blurs the criteria for assessing danger. A responsible approach insists on identifying individuals, actions, networks and evidence. It can therefore be firm towards the extremist while remaining fair towards the citizen.
A country’s resilience is also judged by its ability to identify danger early, without surrendering to easy panic.
Islamist extremism threatens the world because it seeks to abolish the boundary that protects human life from ideological expediency. We must defend that boundary without concessions, through informed services, resilient institutions and societies that refuse to become accustomed to murder. Effective defence begins with a clear acknowledgment: the threat adapts. Our protection must therefore adapt too, while preserving what the extremist seeks to destroy: the worth of every human being.
